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 Abstract 
This study examines overconfidence among managers of Spanish 
equity mutual funds between December 1999 and June 2014. Using 
quarterly turnover ratio as a proxy for overconfidence and a database 
free of both the survivorship bias and the look-ahead bias, we do not 
find strong evidence of overconfidence among mutual fund managers. 
Indeed, the impact of performance on subsequent turnover ratio is not 
statistically significant. However, when separating performance in 
quintiles, we find strong evidence of increase in turnover ratio 
subsequent to poor performance. We conjecture that this phenomenon 
could be related to a possible risk-shifting behavior. 
 
En este estudio, se examina el sesgo de exceso de confianza en 
gestores de fondos de inversión de renta variable nacional de España 
entre diciembre de 1999 y junio de 2014. Empleando una base de 
datos libre del sesgo de supervivencia y del sesgo look-ahead, y 
usando el índice trimestral de rotación de los fondos como proxy, no 
hemos hallado sólidas evidencias de exceso de confianza en dichos 
gestores. Efectivamente, no se ha hallado un impacto estadísticamente 
significativo de la rentabilidad pasada sobre el índice de rotación. No 
obstante, cuando se divide la rentabilidad en quintiles, se encuentra 
evidencia de aumento del índice de rotación después de una 
rentabilidad baja. Se conjetura que este resultado puede estar debido a 
un fenómeno de cambio de nivel de riesgo conocido como risk-
shifting behavior. 
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1. Introduction 
Overconfidence is a robust and well-documented behavioral bias. Originally from the field of 
psychology, the concept has grown even more influential in other fields of study in the recent 
years.
1
 A number of studies conducted on the general population reveal the predominance of 
this bias. Svenson (1981), based on a sample of US students, provides a clear illustration: a 
little more than 80% of the students surveyed believed to be among the top 30% in terms of 
driving safety.  
Due to its prevalence, overconfidence is presented as the root cause behind many 
events, from wars to strikes, from high rates of new start-ups despite notable entrepreneurial 
failure to financial crashes and bubbles (see Moore and Healy, 2008 for a review of papers in 
this line). In Griffin and Tversky’s words: “the significance of overconfidence to the conduct 
of human affairs can hardly be overstated” (1992, p. 432). In fact, overconfidence is not solely 
limited to the lay person. According to Kyle and Wang (1997), experts display more 
overconfidence than novices. Indeed, investigations have evidenced overconfidence in 
different categories of professionals including and not limited to engineers, lawyers, clinical 
psychologists, investment advisors, security analysts, fund managers and entrepreneurs (see 
Moore and Healy, 2008; Kyle and Wang, 1997; Griffin and Tversky, 1992). 
In essence, this paper seeks to examine whether professional investors, specifically 
equity mutual funds managers in Spain, are prone to overconfidence after a good 
performance. This research follows the work of Puetz and Ruenzi (2011) on overconfidence 
among equity mutual fund managers in the US. 
This investigation is important for many reasons. The central axioms of classic finance 
models are those of rational agents and efficient markets. These assumptions, though 
desirable, hardly ever hold in practice. In fact, professional investors evolve in an 
environment where there are numerous pieces of information to process, combined with 
diverging opinions and interpretations and information asymmetry. As pointed out by 
Eshraghi and Taffler (2012: p4), investment managers have “to rely to a large extent on 
subjective judgment, intuition and gut feeling”. Yet, environment is only one part of the 
equation as professional investors have to deal with their own biases, heuristics and fallacies. 
Given such a setting, analyzing investors’ psychology appears to be of uttermost importance 
in order to capture the dynamics of financial markets. Focusing on professional investors is of 
even more importance as they are often expected to behave rationally, at least more than 
                                                          
1
On the 17 September 2015, a rapid search of the keyword overconfidence in the Science Direct database yielded 
4536 results, of which more than 60% were published during the past decade.  
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laypeople. A possible justification for this belief is that professional investors generally 
possess more experience and have more financial knowledge than a lay person.  
Prior literature has identified self-serving attribution bias as the cause of 
overconfidence (Eshraghi and Taffler, 2012; Puetz and Ruenzi, 2011). The self-serving 
attribution bias leads investors to attribute successes to their own dispositions and skills, while 
they tend to attribute poor performance to chance or external forces. As a result, after a good 
performance, investors become more overconfident, but following a poor performance, they 
do not become less overconfident. 
Three types of overconfidence are commonly differentiated in literature: 
Overprecision in the accuracy of one’s belief or miscalibration, overestimation of one’s 
performance or illusion of control and over placement of one’s performance in relation to 
others’ or better-than-average effect (see Glaser, Langer and Weber, 2005; Moore and Healy, 
2008; Glaser and Weber, 2007). Usually, researchers implicitly or explicitly assume the 
different types of overconfidence to be interchangeable, as documented by Moore and Healy 
(2008). Glaser and Weber (2007) have highlighted the importance of distinguishing between 
the types of overconfidence, as they have disparate consequences and thus are measured 
through different experiments and distinct proxies. As pointed out by Moore and Healy 
(2008) confounding the varieties of overconfidence results in empirical inconsistencies and 
methodological problems. Our study is geared towards the analysis of both overestimation of 
one’s performance or illusion of control. 
Eshraghi and Taffler (2012) observed that most studies use laboratory-type 
experiments. Broihanne, Merli and Roger (2014), for instance, measured overconfidence 
through a questionnaire given to a sample of different categories of finance professionals. 
They principally focused on assessing miscalibration and the better-than-average effect. The 
results of this study show that finance professionals are overconfident both on the general and 
the finance domains. According to Eshraghi and Taffler (2012), only a few laboratory-type 
experiments are robust due to issues related to ecological validity. To avoid these issues, 
many studies resort to the use of proxies. In their own study, the latter authors investigated to 
what extent overconfidence affects professional investors’ performance. To measure 
overconfidence, they used both direct testing and proxies. The direct testing implied a content 
analysis of the narratives of reports written by mutual fund managers to their investors. They 
conclude that excessive overconfidence is robustly related to diminished investment returns in 
the 12 months subsequent to the report. 
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The two main proxies used in financial literature to gauge overconfidence are active 
share and trading activity. Active share, a measure introduced by Cremers and Petajisto 
(2009), refers to the percentage or proportion of a portfolio stock holding that differ from the 
benchmark index. In the presence of overconfidence, a good performance will lead to increase 
in active share. Chou and Loi (2010) used absolute deviations from the benchmark and 
conclude that mutual fund managers increase their active share after a good performance but 
do not decrease it after a poor performance. They also find this bias to be more pronounced in 
novice investors than in more experienced investors. 
Trading activity, on the other hand, is a more frequently used proxy to estimate 
overconfidence. Various studies demonstrate that the higher the level of confidence of an 
investor, the greater their trading activity (Barber & Odean, 2000; Barber, 2001; Gervais & 
Odean, 2001; Glaser & Weber, 2007; Moore & Healy, 2008; Odean, 1998a; Odean, 1998b). 
This phenomenon is considered by Odean (1998b) as “the most robust effect of 
overconfidence” (p. 1888). Consistent with these theories, Puetz and Ruenzi (2011) and 
Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) find high trading volumes subsequent to good 
performance. 
While trading activity is a common measure of overconfidence, it should be carefully 
used. Glaser and Weber (2007) correlated overconfidence scores and trading measures. They 
conclude that investors who think they are better than average tend to trade more, while 
miscalibration does not appear to be related to trading volume. 
There is little consensus over the effect of overconfidence on subsequent results. 
Because overconfidence serves as a motivation to trade more aggressively (Barber and Odean, 
2001); it may result in higher expected profits (Kyle and Wang, 1997). Zhou (2015) modeled 
competition among identically and asymmetrically informed agents. The author concludes 
that overconfidence is a virtue given that the imperfectly informed agent can earn more than 
their rational imperfectly informed colleagues. Moreover, under certain specific conditions 
the imperfectly informed agents yield better results when overconfident than when they 
behave rationally. However, this same model concludes that no matter how confident, a less 
informed agent cannot earn more than a better informed agent. 
Contrary to what these models predict, empirical investigations conclude that 
overconfidence leads to poorer performances (Eshraghi and Taffler, 2012; Puetz and Ruenzi 
2011). Eshraghi and Taffler (2012) conclude that the relationship between overconfidence and 
subsequent returns has an inverted-U shape: both excessive confidence and underconfidence 
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negatively impact performance. This can be explained the fact that excess trading leads to 
poorer performance as shown by Barber and Odean (2000). 
In this paper, we test the following null hypothesis: there is no significant evidence of 
individual fund managers’ overconfidence after a good past performance. To measure 
investor’s overconfidence we use trading activity as a proxy, more specifically we use the 
fund’s turnover ratio. The formula used to calculate the turnover ratio permits us minimize the 
effect of flow-induced trading. Among other findings, this study does not find strong evidence 
for the fact that managers increase their turnover ratio in the period subsequent to a top 
performance. However, our results confirm that the relationship between past performance 
and turnover ratio, though not statistically significant, is not linear but U-shaped. When 
separating performance in quintiles, we find strong evidence for increase in turnover ratio 
after poor performance. This can be explained by a change of strategy in funds with the 
lowest performance and is no evidence for overconfidence. This result could be an indicative 
of a possible risk-shifting behavior on the part of managers with poor performance. Indeed the 
motivation for risk-shifting is high for poor performing managers: large payoff if among top 
performing funds against small penalty if fund falls further in rankings. Brown et al (1996) 
provide robust empirical evidence to support this theory. 
A few methodological concerns can be raised. A recent study by Ortiz, Ramírez and 
Vicente (2015) suggests that when using quarterly data instead of monthly data, 38% of the 
trade is missed. Thus, the robustness of the present study could be increased by the use of 
fund’s monthly stock holding data. The main difficulty rises from the fact that this 
information is not publicly available. Another amelioration that could be brought to this study 
is the examination of the relationship between change in performance and subsequent change 
in turnover ratio. 
This paper contributes to two main areas of the existing literature. First, our study is 
part of the strand of literature that explores behavioral biases and investor’s psychology. More 
specifically, we focus on overconfidence of professionals investors. The latter constitute a less 
studied group. Our study is also related to other investigations that share as a common feature 
the analysis of the lead-lag relationship between trading volume and returns, specifically, 
studies that analyze the relationship between returns and subsequent trading volumes.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce our 
equity mutual fund database, provide some descriptive statistics and describe the computation 
of the proxy used to gauge overconfidence. Section 3 includes the empirical analysis and 
presents the results. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper. 
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2. Methodology 
2.1. Sample 
Our initial dataset consists of monthly and quarterly holdings reports of all domestic 
equity mutual funds. From this initial database, we eliminate funds that held less than 75% of 
their assets in cash and stocks listed in Spanish stock exchange market. Thus our selection is 
restricted solely to domestic equity mutual funds. We also control for mergers and 
acquisitions within the sample of funds.  
The final dataset consists of 144 equity mutual funds. A total number of 45,910 
quarterly observations were used to estimate the linear model and the quadratic model of this 
investigation. The time period under study starts in December 1999 and ends in June 2014. 
Quarterly data of funds are publicly available as fund managers in Spain are required to 
disclose their portfolios to investors on a quarterly basis. This means that fund managers can 
infer their relative positions on a quarterly basis and thus adjust their strategy according to this 
information. 
Our database is free of both the survivor bias and the look-ahead bias. Survivor bias 
results from restricting the sample to surviving funds and eliminating all dead funds from the 
database. To avoid the survivor bias, all funds that enter the database remain even if at some 
point in the time period they cease to exist. The least survival period of a fund in the final 
database is six months. The percentage of dead funds during the sample period is 
approximately 55.6%. Look-ahead bias is a consequence of using information outside the 
simulation period. The database used in this study is free of this bias. 
To compute the turnover ratio, as explained in details in the next section, we used 
average price of each stock included in the funds’ portfolio over the quarter. A detailed 
database of funds’ quarterly portfolios was supplied by the Spanish Securities and Exchange 
Commission (CNMV). It is also worth mentioning that the daily prices of close to 90% of the 
stocks in the funds’ portfolio were controlled. Our extensive stock database, supplied by 
DataStream, comprises a total number of 3,188,039 daily observations of stock prices, 
including domestic stocks, other European stocks and foreign stocks.
2
 All of those prices were 
controlled for splits and reverse splits. Each stock was carefully identified by its security 
number to take into account mergers and takeovers. Based on these daily prices we computed 
quarterly average prices of each stock. 
                                                          
2
 We consider as domestic stocks, stocks listed in the Spanish stock market. Other European stocks are stocks 
listed in countries belonging to the European Union excluding Spain. Foreign stocks refer to all other stocks. 
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2.2. Computation of turnover ratios 
Trading activity is the most used proxy for overconfidence. Theories and empirical 
analysis conclude that the higher the confidence level of an investor, the more likely they are 
to trade heavily. Trading activity is a good proxy for gauging retail investors’ confidence level 
but for institutional investors, some adjustments have to be made. Indeed fund managers often 
have to trade because of flows. The effect of this flow-induced trading ought to be minimized 
as only voluntary trading would be a sound proxy for overconfidence. Similarly, exclusions of 
stock from the market were not considered as sales. 
To minimize flow-induced trading, we compute the turnover ratio in line with the 
definition of Elton et al. (2010, p. 914) “the lesser of purchases or sales (excluding all 
securities with maturities less than one year) divided by the average monthly net asset value”. 
Consistent with Elton et al. (2010), we use the following equation: 
𝐶𝑗
+ =   𝑁𝑖 ,𝑗 − 𝑁𝑖 ,𝑗−1 𝑃 𝑖 ,𝑗𝑖  for all i, where  𝑁𝑖 ,𝑗 − 𝑁𝑖 ,𝑗−1 ≥ 0                         (1) 
𝐶𝑗
− =   𝑁𝑖 ,𝑗 − 𝑁𝑖 ,𝑗−1 𝑃 𝑖 ,𝑗𝑖  for all i, where  𝑁𝑖 ,𝑗 − 𝑁𝑖 ,𝑗−1 < 0                         (2) 
where: Ni,j is the number of shares of stock i held at the end of the quarter j 
𝑃 𝑖 ,𝑗  is the average price of stock i over quarter j. 
The equation from Elton et al. (2010) was slightly modified. First, we use quarterly 
information instead of monthly data. Again, in order to approximate with more accuracy the 
total purchases (𝐶𝑗
+) or sales (𝐶𝑗
−), we use average stock price over the quarter instead of 
average of the prices of stock at the beginning and end of period. The turnover ratio of a fund 
is then: 
𝑇𝑅𝑗 =
min⁡(𝐶𝑗
+,𝐶𝑗
− )
TNA      j
                                                                                                       (3) 
where: TRj is the turnover ratio 
TNA      j is the quarterly average of the Total Net Assets of the fund in period j 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Year Number of 
funds 
Average quarterly TNA 
(Euros) 
Quarterly Turnover Ratio 
Mean Min Max 
2000 102 76,942,862 12.46% 0.00% 66.85% 
2001 101 62,027,876 9.37% 0.00% 50.35% 
2002 92 51,770,887 8.53% 0.00% 46.72% 
2003 93 46,911,897 7.49% 0.00% 42.85% 
2004 95 66,336,152 7.67% 0.00% 48.19% 
2005 97 84,294,441 8.58% 0.00% 37.97% 
2006 101 89,281,897 9.67% 0.00% 52.48% 
2007 100 89,886,327 9.92% 0.00% 72.64% 
2008 97 43,907,938 8.39% 0.01% 43.74% 
2009 85 30,786,455 10.57% 0.00% 66.31% 
2010 77 31,981,160 9.77% 0.01% 56.09% 
2011 70 32,512,974 10.26% 0.00% 52.94% 
2012 45 30,184,854 7.87% 0.14% 33.80% 
2013 35 50,327,181 7.40% 0.15% 30.37% 
06/2014 34 81,759,798 9.21% 0.29% 63.38% 
Notes: 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of our sample of funds. Funds that do not invest at least 75% of their total asset in 
domestic stocks were eliminated. Second column refers to the number of funds active during at least a quarter of the year.  
The average quarterly Total Net Assets of each year is contained in the third column. Finally, the mean, minimum and 
maximum of quarterly turnover ratios of each year are contained in the three last columns. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of our sample. Given that we need at least 3-
month data to compute quarterly turnover ratio and quarterly average total net assets, the table 
starts in 2000. Column 2 of Table 1 reports, for each year, the number of funds active at least 
during a quarter. The number of funds is relatively stable until 2008. During the period 2009-
2014, we observe a drastic fall in the total number of funds. This can be explained by the high 
rate of mergers of banking institutions during this same period leading to mutual fund 
mergers. 
The third column shows the average of the quarterly total net asset for each year. The 
highest average quarterly total net asset is in 2007 followed the next year by a sharp decrease 
of more than 50%. The high mean turnover ratio in 2007 could be a consequence of the 
financial crisis that started that same year. It is worth mentioning that the highest turnover 
ratio fund in this study is considerably smaller than that of studies on US equity mutual fund. 
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Puetz and Ruenzi (2011), for instance, found a mean turnover ratio of close to 100% in 2001. 
This suggests that in general equity mutual funds in Spain have a lower turnover ratio than US 
equity mutual funds. 
The average total net asset slowly rises during the period 2010-2014. The fourth, the 
fifth and the sixth columns present the mean, the minimum and the maximum of quarterly 
turnover ratios respectively. The highest mean turnover ratio was in 2000 (12.46%) and the 
least mean turnover ratio in 2013 (7.40%). The maximum quarterly turnover ratio was 
attained in 2007 (72.64%). 
3. Empirical Analysis and Results 
In this study, we examine whether mutual fund managers display overconfidence after 
a good performance. Overconfidence is measured with the use of a proxy: turnover ratio. To 
estimate our models, the turnover ratio of a quarter t (𝑇𝑅𝑝 ,𝑡) is related to the performance in 
the previous quarter t-1 (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑡−1). We have decided to use quarterly data given that Spanish 
mutual funds have the obligation to release quarterly reports, thus we infer that fund managers 
will be influenced by their relative position each quarter and act accordingly. 
Our study is based on the following model proposed by Puetz and Ruenzi (2011): 
𝑇𝑅𝑝 ,𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑡−1,𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠)                                        (4) 
First, we test the following quadratic model using the pooled regression approach 
(Ordinary Least Squares): 
𝑇𝑅𝑝 ,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝛼𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑝 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝛽(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑝 ,𝑡−1)
2+𝛽2𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑝 ,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑝 ,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑝 ,𝑡(5) 
For the quadratic equation (5), we expect a negative slope for past performance 
(Perfp,t-1) and a positive slope for squared past performance (Perfp,t-1)
2
. In the estimation of 
this model, we conjecture negative coefficients for flows and total net assets. Table 3 presents 
the results of the regression analysis of this model (Equation 5). 
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Table 2 
Quadratic Regression Estimation 
Independent Variables Coefficients 
Perfp,t-1 -0.017 
 (-0.71) 
(Perfp,t-1)
2 
0.013 
 (0.57) 
Flowp,t 0.007 
 (0.87) 
lnTNAp,t-1 -0.023*** 
 (-10.94) 
Constant 0.270*** 
 (15.82) 
R
2 
2.5% 
Notes: 
This table presents the results of the estimation of our quadratic model (Equation 5). The dependent variable is the fund’s 
turnover ratio. The independent variables are past performance (raw quarterly returns): Perfp,t-1 and (Perfp,t-1)
2. Two control 
variables were added to control for the indirect effect of flows: Flowp,t and lnTNAp,t-1. The second column shows the 
regression coefficient of each independent variable and beneath it, in parentheses, the t statistics. ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
We find a negative impact for the linear expression of past performance on turnover 
ratio and a positive relationship between the quadratic expression of past performance and 
turnover ratio. However, none of these two coefficients are significantly different from zero. 
Again, we find a significant negative impact of total net assets on the same dependent variable 
but the positive impact of flows does not appear to be statistically different from zero.  
To further the analysis of our data, we have decided to separate performance into 
quintiles. A fund’s past performance refers to the rank of the quarterly position of its raw 
returns in relation to other funds’ returns. Equation (6), (7) and (8) show the ranking process 
of the funds. The best (worst) fund is assigned a one (zero) and the rest of the fund are 
distributed within this range with respect to their returns. We then distribute the funds’ 
performance into three groups, the bottom quintile is LOW, the top quintile is TOP, the 
middle quintiles are classified under MID. As indicated below, the fund with the highest 
performance of the quarter obtains 0.2 in LOW, 0.6 in MID and 0.2 in TOP, thus summing 1. 
Similarly, a fund with a relative performance of 0.7 is allocated 0.2 in LOW, 0.5 in MID and 
0 in TOP.  
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𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑝 ,𝑡−1 = min⁡(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑝 ,𝑡−1, 0.2)                                                       (6) 
𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑝 ,𝑡−1 = min(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑝 ,𝑡−1 − 𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑝 ,𝑡−1, 0.6)                                      (7) 
𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑝 ,𝑡−1 = 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑝 ,𝑡−1 − 𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑝 ,𝑡−1 −𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑝 ,𝑡−1                                 (8)   
Our control variables are flow and total net assets. Puetz and Ruenzi (2011) predict 
that although the turnover ratio has been adjusted for flows, there might still be some indirect 
impact on turnover ratio. We calculate flows following the method suggested by Sirri and 
Tufano (1998). We first compute monthly flows and then convert them into quarterly flows, 
using the following formulas: 
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑝 ,𝑚 =
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑝 ,𝑚 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑝 ,𝑚−1(1 + 𝑟𝑝 ,𝑚 )
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑝 ,𝑚−1
                                            (9) 
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑝 ,𝑡=   1 + 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑝 ,𝑚 − 1
3
𝑚=1                                              (10) 
where: 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑝 ,𝑚  is fund p’s monthly flow 
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑝 ,𝑚  is the total net asset of fund p at the end of the month m 
𝑟𝑝 ,𝑚  is the net return generated by fund p during month m 
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑝 ,𝑡  is fund p’s quarterly flow 
 
The following model is estimated using the pooled regression approach (OLS): 
𝑇𝑅𝑝 ,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1
𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑝 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1
𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑝 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1
𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑝 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑝 ,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑝 ,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑝 ,𝑡       (11) 
Consistent with Puetz and Ruenzi (2011), we conjecture that fund managers with 
excellent past performance will feel overconfident about their skills and abilities and thus 
increase their turnover ratio. However, we do not expect managers of poor performance funds 
to decrease their turnover ratio. They will likely decide to change their strategy, thus engage 
in more trade. Consequently we expect a positive slope for funds in the top quintile and a 
negative slope for funds in the bottom quintile. We have no specific prediction for the sign of 
the coefficient of funds in the middle quintiles. However, we expect this coefficient to be 
smaller in absolute terms than the previous two. 
Following Pollet and Wilson (2008), we expect fund managers to use new money 
inflows to increase their existing investment. An increase in the total net asset results in a 
decrease of the turnover ratio. Thus we expect negative coefficients for both flows and the 
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natural logarithm of total net assets. We used an ordinary-least-squares approach to test our 
model. The results of the regression model (Equation 11) are presented in Table 2. 
Table 3 
Linear Regression Estimation 
Independent Variables Coefficients 
LOWp,t-1 
-0.130** 
(-2.23) 
MIDp,t-1 
0.001 
(0.16) 
TOPp,t-1 
0.007 
(0.16) 
Flowp,t 
0.007 
(0.84) 
lnTNAp,t-1 
-0.023*** 
(-10.88) 
Constant 
0.289*** 
(15.29) 
R
2 
2.60% 
Notes: 
This table reports the results of the estimation of our linear regression model (Equation11). The dependent variable is the 
fund’s turnover ratio and the independent variables are contained in the first column. The first three variables are ranks of 
past performance: LOWp,t-1 for the bottom quintile, MIDp,t-1 for the three middle quintiles and TOPp,t-1 for the upper quintile. 
The other two variables are control variables: Flowp,t and lnTNAp,t-1. The second column shows the regression coefficient of 
each variable and beneath it, in parentheses, the t statistics. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
First, we find a positive impact of past performance on turnover ratio for the upper 
quintile. However, the coefficient βT1 is not statistically significant. Nevertheless, we find a 
significant negative relationship between performance and subsequent turnover ratio for the 
bottom quintile. In this case, the coefficient βL1 is significantly different from zero at the 5%-
level. The coefficient of the three middle quintiles (βM1) is lesser, in absolute terms, than the 
coefficients of the extreme quintiles. Nonetheless, this latter coefficient is not statistically 
significant.  Furthermore, we observe that the control variable lnTNAp,t-1 has a significant 
negative impact on turnover ratio. The coefficient β3 is statistically significant at the 1%-level. 
This result confirms the indirect effect of total net assets on turnover ratio. Finally, the other 
control variable (Flowp,t) has a positive but non-significant impact on turnover ratio.  
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Overall, the results of the regression analysis of the second model align with the 
results of the first model. Both the linear and the quadratic models do not confirm a 
statistically significant relationship between past performance and turnover ratio. However 
when dividing performance in quintiles, we find significant evidence that funds with the 
lowest performance subsequently increase their turnover ratio. This happening can be 
explained by a change of strategy after poor performance and is not an evidence of 
overconfidence. 
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, we examine the overconfidence of managers of Spanish equity mutual 
funds between December 1999 and June 2014. While studies on retail investors’ biases are 
abundant, few studies have focused on assessing the overconfidence of professional investors. 
We gauge overconfidence with the use of turnover ratio. Contrary to the prediction of 
theories (Barber & Odean, 2000; Barber, 2001; Gervais & Odean, 2001; Glaser & Weber, 
2007; Moore & Healy, 2008; Odean, 1998a; Odean, 1998b) and the result of previous 
investigations (Puetz and Ruenzi, 2011; Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink, 2006), we do not find 
strong evidence for overconfidence after good past performance in managers of domestic 
equity mutual funds in Spain. Nonetheless, we find that, though not statistically significant the 
relationship between past performance and turnover ratio is U-shaped. This is consistent with 
other studies such as that of Puetz and Ruenzi (2011). 
It is worth mentioning that we find strong evidence of increase in trading activity in 
the period subsequent to poor performance. This phenomenon can be explained by the fact 
that managers decide to change their strategy. This result could be indicative of a possible 
risk-changes behavior after poor past performance.  
Finally, a few concerns about the methodology employed in this study can be raised. 
Again, alternative methods other than raw returns to measure performance can provide more 
robustness to this study. These methods include but are not limited to Jensen’s Alpha, Fama 
and French three-factor model and Carhart four-factor model. Finally, there are other methods 
to measure the relationship between two or more variables (Random effect and Fund Fixed 
Effect, for instance). 
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